Date : 07 May 2025
Terrorism in the Sahel: How Do Jihadist Groups Acquire Their Weapons?
During the March 28 attack in Diapaga, Burkina Faso, jihadists seized a large quantity of weapons and vehicles. In the Sahel, armed groups are bolstering their arsenals by launching assaults against national forces and their auxiliaries.
The town of Diapaga was the scene of a particularly deadly attack carried out by jihadists from the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM). Arriving on motorbikes, the assailants targeted the local military camp, occupied by soldiers from the Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR) and Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP). Overwhelmed, the Burkinabe forces were forced to retreat, leaving behind a heavy toll: at least 65 people killed, including the base commander, Captain Yannick Sawadogo.
This attack is part of a cycle of clashes and reprisals. It is believed to be in response to the massacre of over 58 Fulani civilians in Solenzo on March 10 and 11, allegedly committed by Burkinabe soldiers and VDP fighters. Videos shared on social media appear to implicate pro-governmentDuring the March 28 attack in Diapaga, Burkina Faso, jihadists seized a large quantity of weapons and vehicles. In the Sahel, armed groups are bolstering their arsenals by launching assaults against national forces and their auxiliaries.
The town of Diapaga was the scene of a particularly deadly attack carried out by jihadists from the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM). Arriving on motorbikes, the assailants targeted the local military camp, occupied by soldiers from the Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR) and Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP). Overwhelmed, the Burkinabe forces were forced to retreat, leaving behind a heavy toll: at least 65 people killed, including the base commander, Captain Yannick Sawadogo.
This attack is part of a cycle of clashes and reprisals. It is believed to be in response to the massacre of over 58 Fulani civilians in Solenzo on March 10 and 11, allegedly committed by Burkinabe soldiers and VDP fighters. Videos shared on social media appear to implicate pro-government militias in these atrocities, specifically targeting the Fulani community. Human Rights Watch (HRW) condemned these crimes, urging authorities to conduct impartial investigations and prosecute those responsible. HRW also warned of a high risk of reprisals by jihadist groups—a prediction tragically borne out by the assault on Diapaga, during which the attackers seized numerous weapons, ammunition, and vehicles. militias in these atrocities, specifically targeting the Fulani community. Human Rights Watch (HRW) condemned these crimes, urging authorities to conduct impartial investigations and prosecute those responsible. HRW also warned of a high risk of reprisals by jihadist groups—a prediction tragically borne out by the assault on Diapaga, during which the attackers seized numerous weapons, ammunition, and vehicles.
National armies: the main unintentional suppliers of weapons to terrorists
Available information, though still incomplete, indicates that JNIM fighters may have captured around 240 light weapons, 179 boxes of ammunition, and a large number of motorbikes. Three militarized Toyota Land Cruiser pickups, equipped with ZSU-23-2 anti-aircraft cannons, were also reportedly seized.
Despite this significant haul, Jafar Dicko, JNIM's emir in Burkina Faso, stated in a video released after the attack that his group still lacked the arsenal and logistical capacity needed to fulfill its ambitions. He nevertheless announced plans to ramp up attacks on military installations and VDP units to boost the group's operational capabilities.
In the Sahel, armed groups have gradually moved away from traditional supply chains—such as the Libyan arms trade—in favor of direct raids on national forces. This strategy, combined with the exploitation of weaknesses in auxiliary forces and the growing use of technologies like FPV drones, is profoundly reshaping the tactical balance on the ground.
The presence of the Wagner Group in Mali since 2021 adds another layer to the conflict. In April 2025, an attack on the Kawla camp enabled the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) to seize Russian-made weapons, including RPG-29s originally delivered to Russian mercenaries. Documented by HRW, the abuses committed by Wagner operatives have fueled local distrust, easing jihadist infiltration.
The Liptako-Gourma region—a strategic area at the junction of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger—alone accounts for 80% of attacks on military installations recorded since 2019. While the VDP play a key role in securing rural areas, they have also become prime targets for armed groups.
VDP: a structural vulnerability exploited
The strengthening of Defense and Security Forces (DSF) in the region has been accompanied by the mass recruitment of over 50,000 VDP fighters in Burkina Faso, significantly increasing the circulation of weapons in conflict zones. This growth, though essential to territorial defense, has also heightened the logistical vulnerability of local forces.
VDP units are mainly equipped with light weapons—AK-47 assault rifles and 12-gauge shotguns—whose storage remains problematic. Only 41% of units have secure storage facilities; the rest rely on rudimentary caches (attics, pits, wells), which are easily discovered during attacks.
According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), about 12% of the 37,000 weapons distributed to the VDP between 2022 and 2024 are believed to have ended up in the hands of armed groups. This creates a vicious cycle: successful raids strengthen terrorist groups, enabling them to launch further attacks and expand their arsenals.
Cultural and geographic proximity between certain rural communities and jihadist groups—especially along the Burkina Faso–Mali border—also facilitates the transfer of weapons without combat, through intimidation or voluntary support. According to MINUSMA, each attack on a VDP post results in the average recovery of eight assault rifles and 200 rounds of ammunition. These gains, while modest in isolation, are significant at the regional level.
Fragmented arsenals, a reflection of territorial division
The analysis of equipment seized during military operations by the DSF reveals major disparities among terrorist groups, linked to both their areas of operation and their supply chains.
For example, during “Operation Green Whirlwind,” conducted from February 27 to April 2, 2025, in the Sourou Valley, DSF forces recovered an arsenal largely composed of Russian and Chinese weapons: AK-47 assault rifles and Chinese copies (Type 56, 56-1, 56-2), PKMS and PMCS machine guns, DShK heavy machine guns, RPG-7 rocket launchers, mortars, and 12-gauge shotguns.
The significant presence of the latter—typically used by Dozo hunters in Mali’s Dogon Country—suggests transfers via looting or opportunism. This also highlights the limited permeability between different katibas. For instance, weapons used by the Hanifa katiba (active in eastern Burkina Faso and southern Tillabéri) are not observed in the hands of the Macina katiba, despite both being part of the same network (JNIM) but operating in Mali.
This operational compartmentalization, which results in logistical fragmentation, prevents broad sharing of resources and keeps each katiba relatively autonomous in terms of supply.
Terrorism in the Sahel: a dynamic of expansion toward the Gulf of Guinea
The growth of terrorist groups in the Sahel is driven by intensive recruitment, blending indoctrination, social pressure, and coercion. Socioeconomic vulnerabilities—poverty, unemployment, and communal tensions—encourage enlistment, particularly in rural areas. Ghana, previously relatively untouched, is now experiencing worrying cross-border recruitment, with several hundred young people reportedly joining the fighting in the Sahel.
This demographic expansion increases the logistical needs of armed groups, which still struggle to build sufficient arsenals to conduct large-scale offensives. This shortfall, though temporary, does not undermine their strategy of territorial expansion, particularly toward poorly governed border areas.
The main long-term risk is that they reach a critical mass of weaponry, paving the way for an intensification of attacks in both frequency and lethality. Already, early signs point to an expansion toward the coastal states of the Gulf of Guinea, including Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, Togo, and Ghana, where terrorist groups are seeking to establish rear bases and local support networks.