Date : 08 Apr 2025
Wagner and Africa Corps in West Africa: Security Implications of Russia’s Presence
Africa’s Evolving Security Landscape
West Africa and the Sahel are undergoing a profound reconfiguration of their security architecture, marked by growing reliance on external actors—both state and non-state. Amid persistent instability, the withdrawal of Western partners, and the escalation of terrorist threats, several African nations are forging new alliances to safeguard their sovereignty.
The Africa Corps, formerly known as Wagner, exemplifies this shift. Highly active in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, it plays a pivotal role in supporting transitional governments. However, the involvement of these Russian forces raises critical questions about the sovereignty of host states and the long-term implications of such partnerships. Between Wagner’s mercenary model and the more institutionalized structure of the Africa Corps, a new security paradigm is taking shape—one that redefines regional geopolitical balances and challenges the role of traditional Western powers.
Wagner et Africa Corps : origines et transformation
Wagner : Un acteur hybride entre mercenariat et influence étatique
Fondé en 2014 par Dmitry Utkin et Yevgeny Prigozhin, le groupe Wagner – officielement « PMC Wagner » – s’est rapidement imposé comme un outil de projection de puissance pour la Russie. Bien que présenté comme une entreprise militaire privée, Wagner opère en étroite coordination avec l’État russe. Sous la direction de Prigozhin jusqu’à sa mort le 23 août 2023, le groupe a mené des interventions militaires directes tout en exploitant illégalement des ressources naturelles dans des zones de conflit. Son action, souvent marquée par des méthodes brutales, a contribué à déstabiliser certains États tout en renforçant la présence russe.
Africa Corps : Une restructuration sous contrôle du Kremlin
À la suite de la disparition de Prigozhin, le ministère russe de la Défense a repris en main les opérations africaines de Wagner, donnant naissance à l’Africa Corps. L’héritier de Wagner vise à renforcer l’influence de la Russie en Afrique avec une approche plus institutionnalisée et coordonnée. L'Africa Corps se concentre sur la formation des forces locales et la sécurisation des infrastructures stratégiques, transformant ainsi les opérations clandestines en une présence militaire assumée et intégrée. Cette nouvelle entité s’affirme comme un instrument officiel de l’influence russe en Afrique.
Implantation et expansion en Afrique
Les interventions de Wagner et de l’Africa Corps répondent à une demande croissante de soutien militaire face aux insurrections djihadistes et aux conflits internes, notamment après le retrait progressif des partenaires occidentaux. Toutefois, ce partenariat s’accompagne souvent d’accords opaques liant assistance sécuritaire et concessions économiques (mines, hydrocarbures, infrastructures). Wagner et l'Africa Corps sont donc actifs dans plusieurs pays africains, comme l’illustre la carte ci-dessous.
State of Russian Military Presence in Africa in 2025
Mali: The Dual Military Presence of Wagner and the Africa Corps
Since late 2021, Russia—first through the Wagner Group and now via the Africa Corps—has strengthened its military foothold in Mali. Satellite imagery of the Russian military base near Modibo Keïta International Airport in Bamako reveals significant expansion between December 2024 and January 2025, including new road construction, military equipment movements, and excavation work. In early February 2025, the Africa Corps deployed its units to Mali, marked by the arrival of a large convoy of Russian military equipment from Conakry, seen on the streets of Bamako.
Wagner, active in the country since 2021, has been involved not only in military training but also in frontline combat, suffering heavy losses—particularly in Tinzaouatene in July 2024. An internal rivalry with the Africa Corps, underscored by competing propaganda videos, has allowed Wagner operatives to maintain a presence. However, they are expected to be gradually replaced by personnel from the Russian Ministry of Defense, perceived as more politically acceptable.
Burkina Faso–Russia: A Deepening Partnership
In January 2024, the Africa Corps announced the deployment of around 100 Russian mercenaries to Ouagadougou, forming the first wave of a 300-man unit tasked with securing Captain Ibrahim Traoré, conducting patrols in high-risk zones, and training Burkinabe troops. Their base was established in Loumbila, a rural commune approximately 20 kilometers northeast of the capital. One month later, the Burkinabe government signed a series of cooperation agreements with Russia in key sectors including defense, humanitarian aid, energy, and nuclear development.
While the ruling authorities—aligned with a "Sankarist" tradition—are wary of foreign military overreach, Russia may seek to impose a more assertive presence, particularly to counterbalance China and Turkey, which remain the primary arms suppliers to the country, including in armored vehicles and drones.
Niger: A Renewed Strategic Alliance
Following the withdrawal of Western forces, Russia has reasserted its military presence in Niger. In April 2024, the Africa Corps deployed a 100-man contingent of instructors to train Nigerien troops—a deployment that coincided with the departure of U.S. forces and received significant media attention. These instructors, based at Air Base 101 in Niamey, are focused on troop training and securing the ruling regime.
More recently, increased aerial activity around Air Base 201 in Agadez—formerly used by American forces—with flights coming from Libya, signals the potential for a long-term Africa Corps installation, solidifying Russia’s strategic posture in the region.
Central African Republic: A Firm Russian Foothold
Russia’s involvement in the Central African Republic (CAR) began in 2018 via the Wagner Group and has since expanded across military, economic, and even cultural sectors. Initially engaged in arms deliveries and regime protection, Russian paramilitaries are now entrenched within the country's power structure. In December 2024, a statue of Yevgeny Prigozhin was unveiled in Bangui, symbolizing the depth of Russian influence.
Despite persistent allegations of brutality—including arbitrary arrests, torture, summary executions, and the plundering of mineral resources—the presence of Russian operatives in CAR remains unchallenged. The country stands as Wagner’s most deeply entrenched outpost in Africa, where the exchange of security for access to national wealth has come at a high human and sovereign cost.
Libya–Russia: A Strategic Logistical Hub
Since 2018, Wagner has played a pivotal role in supporting Libya’s National Army under General Haftar. Simultaneously, the Africa Corps has sustained a presence in the country, viewing Libya as a critical logistics platform for Sahel operations. Russia has shown a growing interest in Libya’s oil and gold resources and is exploring the possibility of establishing a naval base on its territory. Long-standing ties with Haftar have facilitated a strengthened Russian position, especially through Wagner's involvement.
Following the fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, Moscow has increased military transfers from its Latakia base to Benghazi and reinforced its operations at Libya’s main airbases. Most recently, it has deployed units to Maaten al-Sarra, near the borders with Chad and Sudan, to secure a key logistical corridor linking Libya to the Sahel and the Central African Republic.
Equatorial Guinea: Close-Protection Deployment
In late 2024, around 200 Russian instructors arrived discreetly in Malabo—likely members of the Africa Corps. These forces are responsible for training elite Equatoguinean guards and protecting Vice President Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue, the son and potential successor of President Teodoro Obiang Nguema. This deployment marks another step in the expansion of Russian influence in West Africa.
Back in June, Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov announced the signing of a military training agreement between Moscow and Malabo. “This agreement will allow Russian instructors to travel to Equatorial Guinea to train military personnel from various units of the national armed forces,” he stated on social media platform X.
Toward Further Expansion in Africa?
Beyond these key countries, emerging reports suggest that both Wagner and the Africa Corps have expressed interest in expanding to additional African states, including Mozambique, Madagascar, Zimbabwe, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Chad. Russia's broader strategy appears aimed at securing a swath of northern Africa stretching from the Red Sea to the Atlantic, while deepening its footprint in the Gulf of Guinea and Central Africa—particularly in Chad.
Russia in Africa: A New Chapter Under the Africa Corps
The emergence of the Africa Corps marks a new phase in Russia's influence strategy on the African continent. Operating under the direct authority of the Russian Ministry of Defense, this entity seeks to formalize and structure operations previously conducted by the Wagner Group, thereby consolidating Moscow’s military footprint in Africa. The Africa Corps is believed to have around 5,000 operatives deployed across several African nations. While the Corps expands Russia’s reach, its actions continue to raise concerns over security dynamics and the protection of local populations' rights.
By taking up Wagner’s mantle, the Africa Corps offers African states an alternative to traditional Western alliances. Yet this military cooperation brings into question the sovereignty of partner nations and the true cost of such security dependence. As Russia pushes further into the region, Africa is increasingly becoming an arena of great power competition—with uncertain implications for its long-term stability.