Date : 20 Mar 2025
Military FPV drone: a growing threat in West African conflicts
FPV drones have made their appearance in conflicts in West Africa and the Sahel. Terrorist groups, separatists and mercenaries are beginning to use them for surveillance and precision strikes.
On 5 March 2025, the Institute for Economics and Peace published the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) 2025. This report reveals that four West African countries are among the ten most affected by terrorism in 2024: Burkina Faso (1), Mali (4), Niger (5) and Nigeria (6). This region is marked by the activity of several armed groups, including Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWAP) and Boko Haram.
These groups are evolving their combat tactics by incorporating new technologies, in particular the growing use of FPV (First Person View) drones and the construction of improvised explosive devices. These drones are also used by separatist groups, notably the Tuareg, and by Wagner mercenaries. This tactical innovation is transforming the security landscape in West Africa and the Sahel, introducing complex operational challenges for security forces.
What is an FPV drone?
FPV (First-Person View) drones have undergone a spectacular transformation over the years, evolving from recreational tools used for aerial competitions to essential military equipment in modern conflicts. These drones allow the pilot to view in real time what the drone “sees” via an on-board camera and a live video transmission system to a helmet or special goggles.
Over time, FPV drones have been adapted for military applications, becoming valuable tools for reconnaissance, target identification and direct strikes. Their ability to fly at low altitude and penetrate tight spaces, such as the windows of buildings or the hatches of armoured vehicles, makes them particularly effective for targeted attacks.
In current conflicts, FPV drones are equipped with explosives or grenades, enabling extremely precise strikes. They can also be suicide drones, also known as “prowler munitions”, designed to destroy targets by crashing directly into them with their explosive charge. These technologies enable users to carry out stealthy attacks that are difficult to anticipate, creating a major challenge for security forces.
FPV drones for military use in the Sahel
The emergence of FPV drones in conflicts in West Africa and the Sahel is a worrying development for regional security. An incident occurred on 11 February 2025 in Tessalit, Mali. Tuareg separatists claimed to have shot down a Malian army helicopter, a claim quickly denied by the Malian Armed Forces , which stated that it was in fact a drone that had been intercepted while attempting to observe a helicopter in transit. Although this information remains unverified, it strongly suggests the use of an FPV drone, testifying to the rapid adoption of this technology by non-state armed groups. Following an attack on an army camp in Pama, Burkina Faso, in February 2025, JNIM published images of stolen equipment, including a high-quality Chinese DJI Matrice 30T drone, indicating that Burkinabe forces have also begun to incorporate these advanced technologies into their arsenal.
The first cases of drones loaded with explosives being used in West Africa have been reported in recent months. West African national armies still favour larger drones, including Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 and Bayraktar Akıncı drones. It is terrorist and separatist groups that have pioneered the adoption of FPV drones.In December 2024 in Nigeria, ISWAP deployed four DJI MAVIC drones armed with improvised airdroppable munitions in coordinated attacks against forward operating bases in Wajiroko, Borno State. This significant escalation in complex attack tactics demonstrates the rapid adaptation of armed groups to emerging technologies.
JNIM has claimed responsibility for an ambush on Russian mercenaries in the Kidal region, publishing images of a Chinese-made DJI Mavic Air 2 drone controller, suggesting that this type of equipment is now part of Wagner's standard kit in Mali. In October 2024, near Tinzaouatene, Wagner mercenaries reportedly attempted to use a Russian ZALA KYB suicide drone during an operation to recover the bodies of their slain comrades. At the same time, Tuareg separatists published images taken from an FPV drone showing ammunition being fired at a Malian armed forces camp in Goundam. In September 2024, a Tuareg rebel movement used an FPV drone to monitor a camp housing Malian forces and the Wagner militia in Léré. The images published on social networks served as a warning, illustrating the psychological dimension of this new threat. The JNIM has also used drones to monitor and film attacks in Boni in Niger and Kpékankandi in Togo, documenting soldiers fleeing their assaults.
The chronology of incidents involving FPV drones in the Sahel reveals a worrying learning curve. In November 2023, the JNIM carried out a kamikaze drone attack on a FAMa base in Niafounké. The operation was filmed for propaganda purposes.
Although the use of FPV drones is not yet as developed in the Sahel as in Ukraine, their destructive potential is considerable. These technologies could radically transform the conduct of military operations in the region, offering non-state actors reconnaissance, targeting and attack capabilities previously reserved for conventional armies. This democratisation of tactical air capabilities represents a major challenge for the Sahelian security forces.
The origins of FPV drones in armed conflicts
FPV drones have proved to be key elements in modern conflicts. Their ability to penetrate enemy defences and carry out reconnaissance and strike missions has forced armies to adapt their tactics and develop specific countermeasures. The military use of FPV drones dates back several decades, but it has developed particularly in the 2010s, thanks to technological advances. For example, during the Four-Day War in Nagorno-Karabagh in 2016, Azerbaijan used Harop suicide drones to attack Armenian military convoys. However, these were FPV drones specially designed for military purposes.
Today, a large proportion of FPV drones used in conflicts are militarised civilian drones, particularly in Ukraine. Since the start of the Russian invasion in February 2022, both belligerents have rapidly adapted their strategies to integrate these devices into their military operations. Civilian FPV drones have been modified to become formidable weapons on the battlefield.
Their use has become a major asset in this conflict because of their effectiveness and low cost. Each unit costs less than 500 dollars, making them affordable for intensive use. Thanks to these drones, the Ukrainian armed forces can compensate for shortages of heavy weapons supplied by allied countries, while maintaining constant pressure on Russian forces. The FPV UAV business model, based on mass production and low cost, means they can be used intensively in a conflict where attrition is a critical factor.