Date : 14 Feb 2025

Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs): carnage in Mali and Burkina Faso

In Mali and Burkina Faso, improvised explosive devices have become the weapon of choice for terrorist groups, indiscriminately killing civilians and military personnel, thereby instilling terror.

On January 24, 2025, in Mali, four Malian gendarmes, including a commanding officer, were killed in an improvised explosive device (IED) attack near the city of Konna. This attack, claimed by the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (GSIM), underscores the persistent IED threat in the Mopti and Ségou regions, despite ongoing counterterrorism efforts. On January 22, 2025, in Burkina Faso, elements of the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), affiliated with Al-Qaeda, assaulted the town of Sebba. After an unsuccessful attempt to seize the town and its military camp, the assailants planted IEDs along the route of a resupply convoy, aiming to ambush the Burkinabé armed forces. IEDs have become the weapon of choice for terrorist armed groups in the Sahel.

What is an IED?

IEDs are homemade explosive devices constructed in an unconventional manner. They are crafted using simple and accessible materials—an explosive charge, a primer charge, a detonator, and a mechanical or electronic triggering system—making them formidable weapons in asymmetric conflicts. These devices offer significant tactical and strategic advantages: often referred to as "the poor man's landmines," they enable continuous harassment of opposing forces. IEDs impose a war of attrition. They can vary in size, complexity, and power, ranging from small devices designed to injure or kill individuals to large bombs capable of destroying vehicles or buildings.

IEDs are particularly dangerous due to their ability to be concealed and triggered unpredictably, often in civilian areas. They do not discriminate between civilian and military victims. Consequently, they are also employed to terrorize populations and disrupt governmental and humanitarian services. Moreover, they weaken military capabilities and reconstruction efforts, potentially granting insurgents a long-term strategic advantage.

Different Types of IEDs

IEDs come in various forms, tailored to different situations and objectives. Among the most common are:

Victim-Operated IEDs (VOIEDs): These detonate when the target interacts with the device, comes into contact with it, or approaches it.
Command-Operated IEDs (COIEDs): These are remotely detonated by an operator, either via a wire or remote control, allowing for precise and controlled activation.
Time-Delayed IEDs (TIEDs): These are programmed to explode after a predetermined delay, often using a mechanical or electronic timer.

The Components of an IED

IEDs contain explosive, incendiary, or toxic chemical elements. These devices are often assembled from disparate materials. A distinction must be made between explosives derived from military ordnance—such as grenades—and homemade explosives (HME), which are crafted from non-military components and are the most prevalent.

Sophisticated IEDs typically employ high explosives, known for their rapid detonation velocity. However, the risk persists that toxic chemical, biological, or radioactive substances may be incorporated to amplify their destructive and psychological impact. The variety of IED designs enables armed groups to adapt to different tactical environments, complicating both detection and neutralization efforts.

The Evolution of IEDs: From Iraq to Afghanistan

Though IEDs have been used in earlier conflicts, they gained prominence during the Iraq War in 2003. Faced with the overwhelming firepower of Western coalitions, insurgents turned to IEDs as a means of asymmetric warfare, inflicting highly visible and demoralizing losses at minimal cost. The vast stockpiles of munitions left behind by Saddam Hussein’s regime provided ample resources for an unprecedented wave of IED attacks.

The knowledge and techniques for constructing and deploying IEDs later spread to other conflict zones, particularly Afghanistan. Unlike in Iraq, where repurposed military ordnance was widely used, Afghan insurgents—who had less access to heavy munitions—relied more heavily on fertilizer-based explosives, particularly ammonium nitrate and potassium nitrate.

Afghanistan also saw widespread deployment of IEDs in remote or low-traffic areas, a tactic facilitated by its less-developed road infrastructure compared to Iraq. While U.S. counterinsurgency measures improved IED detection and neutralization rates and enhanced troop protection, these advancements often merely shifted the threat onto Afghan security forces.

By 2011, more than half of NATO troop casualties in Afghanistan were attributed to IED attacks—an indication of their tactical effectiveness. More recently, these devices have played a central role in the Syrian-Iraqi conflict. A 2021 report by Handicap International estimated that nearly one in four Iraqis remains exposed to the dangers of IED contamination. The same report pointed to a sharp rise in IED-related incidents in Mali, mirroring trends observed in previous conflict zones.

The Spread of IEDs in the Sahel

Since 2013, improvised explosive devices have become a weapon of choice for armed groups operating in the Sahel. Over the past two years, their use has persisted—particularly in Burkina Faso and Mali. According to the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, Mali has seen a growing prevalence of pressure-activated improvised mines since 2017, while Burkina Faso has witnessed a sharp rise in roadside IED attacks in its northern and eastern regions since 2018.

Groups such as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), Al-Qaeda’s Sahel affiliate, use these devices to disrupt key transport corridors and destabilize security forces. IEDs are frequently placed along strategic roads, primarily targeting military convoys and security patrols. This tactic has proven highly effective, hampering troop movements and instilling fear among local populations.

Armored vehicles used by Sahelian military forces and Russian Wagner Group operatives in Mali are frequently targeted. On June 11, 2024, in Keibané, Mali, a Wagner patrol was ambushed by an IED planted by Katiba Macina. The explosion killed two Russian mercenaries and wounded eleven others. The regions most affected by these attacks include Mopti and Koulikoro in Mali, as well as the Boucle du Mouhoun region in Burkina Faso.

A Tactical Resurgence Fueled by Middle Eastern Expertise

Recent developments suggest that highly specialized IED expertise has been reintroduced into the Sahel. The resurgence of sophisticated explosive tactics hints at the presence of foreign bomb-making specialists within groups like JNIM and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). These experts, believed to have Middle Eastern origins, enhance the lethality and operational effectiveness of IED attacks.

This expertise was notably employed in late July 2024, when IEDs were used to cripple a Wagner convoy en route to Tinzaouatène. The Battle of Tinzaouatène, fought between July 25 and 27, 2024, underscored this evolving threat. Rebel forces from the Strategic Framework for the Defense of the People of Azawad (CSP-DPA) engaged Malian troops and Wagner fighters, inflicting a decisive defeat. The clashes resulted in the destruction of multiple military vehicles and heavy casualties:84 Russian mercenaries and 47 Malian soldiers were killed.

The strategic use of IEDs played a pivotal role in turning the tide of battle, demonstrating the increasing sophistication of explosive warfare in the region.

This evolution raises alarm over the growing complexity of the Sahelian insurgency. The arrival of foreign-trained IED specialists has significantly bolstered the capabilities of terrorist groups, allowing for more audacious and meticulously orchestrated attacks. The Battle of Tinzaouatène stands as a stark illustration of this trend, with profound implications for regional security and the fragile stability of Sahelian states.