Benin’s security apparatus put to the test by the terrorist threat in border areas

Benin’s security apparatus put to the test by the terrorist threat in border areas

The terrorist attack on a position of the Beninese army deployed on the border with Burkina Faso, which killed two soldiers in December 2021, marks the beginning of an intensification of the jihadist threat in the country. Since 2021, the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) has recorded 57 terrorist attacks in the country, mainly in the northern departments of Alibori and Atacora. Two main armed terrorist groups affiliated to the Rally for the Victory of Islam and Muslims [Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)] and created in 2018, are active in the area: the North-West group led by Sékou Moulismou, whose activities are concentrated in the Atacora border area, and the North group, which focuses its attacks on the Tapoa area. In early May 2023, around twenty people were killed in three attacks in two localities in the commune of Kérou, in the Atacora region, including one attack using an improvised explosive device (IED). Last May, three other attacks were recorded in the north of the country: two in Alibori, including the attack on the hamlet of Yinyinrou, which left three people dead, and the IED attack in Loumbou Loumbou; and another one in Kaobagou in Atacora, during which seven men had their throats cut and thirteen people were abducted.

Forest parks – terrorist sanctuaries

For several years, the forests of northern Benin have been a sanctuary for jihadist cells operating in southern Niger and Burkina Faso. The Pendjari parks and the WAP (W-Arly-Pendjari) complex are ideal refuge areas for armed terrorist groups, as the dense vegetation cover allows them to hide easily and limits the vehicle patrols of the Beninese armed forces (BAF), which have difficulty operating there. In addition, these forest areas are also suitable for the development of cross-border trafficking (arms, drugs, fuel, etc.) between the Sahelian hinterland and the coasts of the Gulf of Guinea. In 2022, some fifteen terrorist attacks were carried out against the security forces and twelve IED attacks were recorded with a view to testing Benin’s security arrangements and securing the WAP complex. On the outskirts, armed terrorist groups harassed the authorities and administrative buildings, and also threatened schools. The aim was to prevent the civilian population from collaborating with the BAF and to reduce the presence of the state, as demonstrated by the attack on the Dassari police station on 26 June 2022 and the attack on the Goungou customs post three months later.

Persistent inter-community conflicts

As in neighbouring countries, northern Benin is faced with virulent and sometimes deadly inter-community conflicts over access to resources. There are three causes of these tensions: unequal access to land between herders and farmers, a deficient land ownership system and the questionable and exclusive management of forest parks by the private South African NGO African Parks Network, causing frustration among local populations. However, inter-ethnic friction could provide shortly fertile ground for the development of a Beninese recruitment centre. In August 2022, the emir of the RVIM cell operating in the border area with Burkina Faso, Sheikh Albaani, spoke in one of the most widely spoken dialects in the north of the country, in a video broadcast on al-Zallaqa, the official RVIM channel. The video was part of a local recruitment strategy by the Qaidi group in northern Benin, which could indicate its desire to establish a long-term presence there.

Security operations

Despite clear signs of the risk of Sahelian jihadism spreading to the north of the country, the Beninese authorities rarely comment on the security incidents affecting the country. Although the BAF are already present in the northern regions with Operation Mirador, some 450 soldiers have been mobilised to monitor the W and Pendjari national parks, and Operation Araignée to monitor the classified forest areas of Agrimey and Kétou. The aim of these operations is to patrol, monitor and combat poaching, as well as to manage infrastructure (roads, bridges, etc.). In response to the sustained and growing deterioration of security in border areas, last May the governments of Niger and Benin launched the “cross-border project to support the strengthening of community security, the management and prevention of conflicts linked to transhumance and the management of natural resources”. Implemented in the communes of Malanville, Karimama and Kandi, this project aims to increase the state and military presence in the north of the country.

In the short term, the Qaidi cells of the RVIM should continue to take root in these areas, which are conducive to their withdrawal and logistical deployment, while pursuing their strategy of harassing the BAF from Burkina Faso.