Yellowcake: Which Dangers and Stakes Lie Ahead for the Uranium Convoy?

 

A Massive Convoy

On November 27, 2025, two convoys carrying nearly 1,000 tons of “yellowcake” departed from the mines of Arlit. This production, formerly operated by the French company Orano, was split into two parts. The first, consisting of 34 trucks, arrived in Niamey on December 4, 2025, where it was parked near Air Base 101. The second, made up of 20 trucks, joined the convoy on December 9. The total value of the cargo is estimated at more than 170 million US dollars.

The operation involves an complex logistical setup: 41 trucks from the company BM Trans and 13 trucks from its subsidiary Oyam, all escorted by Russian mercenaries from the Africa Corps as well as the Nigerien National Guard (GNN). Sources estimate the total convoy to comprise more than 100 vehicles.

 

Uranium: From Orano’s Operations to Nationalization

“Yellowcake” is a powder obtained after the chemical processing of uranium ore. This concentrate must still be converted and enriched before it can be used as fuel in nuclear power plants. In other words, it is an intermediate stage between raw ore and nuclear fuel. While it cannot be used directly, it remains a strategic product that is closely monitored on international markets.

This material comes from the Somaïr mine (Société des Mines de l’Aïr), located near Arlit in the Agadez region of northern Niger. The mine was majority-owned by the French company Orano (63%), with the remainder held by the Nigerien state-owned company Sopamin (36%).

Since the coup d’état of July 2023, the authorities in Niamey have gradually taken operational control of the mine and blocked uranium exports. In December 2024, Orano lost access to its production, and in June 2025 Niger announced the nationalization of Somaïr.

Finally, on December 1, 2025—four days after the convoy’s departure—Niger officially announced the release of its uranium onto the international market, including the yellowcake from Somaïr, without taking into account the arbitration procedures initiated by Orano to defend its interests. The French company immediately condemned the shipment, describing it as “illegal.”

To date, no major international agency has officially confirmed the identity of the buyer of this yellowcake or its final destination. Several sources, however, point to Russian interests, which may be taking advantage of Niger’s financial difficulties to gain control of this uranium.

As this announcement sparks international controversy, the convoy has been halted since December 4, making the future of this strategic cargo toward its destination—the port of Lomé in Togo—uncertain.

 

 

 

 

Niger Defies International Law

The Orano yellowcake case ihighlights the major international risks posed by the transport of nuclear materials in a context of legal and political conflict.

Orano has denounced the illegal nature of the movement of its product, which occurred while a dispute between the company and the Nigerien state was still ongoing. The cargo is considered illicit due to the absence of a legally transferred title of ownership, a situation compounded by proceedings before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). In a ruling issued on September 23, 2025, ICSID explicitly ordered Niger not to sell, transfer, or facilitate the transfer of uranium extracted prior to nationalization, under penalty of violating international investment law.

Such a situation exposes not only the actors involved to legal sanctions, but also weakens the global architecture of nuclear non-proliferation and security, which is based on transparency, traceability, and strict compliance with international law.

 

 

Terrorist Risks for the Convoy

The yellowcake convoy crossing the Sahel is moving through an extremely degraded security environment, posing a major terrorist risk. Between Niamey and the Burkinabè border, 35 attacks attributed to JNIM were recorded during the first six months of 2025, illustrating the intensity of the threat along this strategic corridor. This area, effectively a war zone, is marked by the simultaneous presence of multiple terrorist groups capable of carrying out complex operations.

The risk increases further in Burkina Faso, where armed groups are refining the use of suicide drones and explosive-carrying drones, making land convoys increasingly vulnerable.

In such a context, a yellowcake transport constitutes an ideal target: its economic value makes it a prize for predation that could finance terrorist groups, while also providing them with political and security leverage. The capture or resale of this material would strengthen their operational capabilities and contribute to regional instability, turning an industrial convoy into an aggravating factor of transnational terrorism.

 

 

Environmental and Health Risks

The international transport of yellowcake outside any recognized legal framework also entails significant environmental and human risks.

Although only weakly radioactive, Yellowcake is primarily chemically toxic, representing a real health and human risk. It is radiotoxic, particularly if inhaled or ingested, as it contains radioactive particles that can cause cancer.

It also poses an ecological risk, whether during land transport or maritime transport. If the product were to be dispersed into the environment, it could severely affect ecosystems, leading to long-term contamination of soils, groundwater, and natural habitats. This would deprive surrounding populations of drinking water and food resources through agriculture and livestock farming.

Moreover, if an accident were to occur during maritime transport, the cargo released into the oceans would contaminate marine organisms through ingestion or dissolution in water. Consequently, fishing areas and coral reefs would be affected, exposing populations to health risks linked to the consumption of seafood.

 

 

Conclusion

In conclusion, the potential catastrophic scenarios surrounding this convoy are numerous.

It could trigger international sanctions against Niger, as well as the isolate Togo, which by allowing the convoy to transit would appear aligned with Russian interests, thereby strengthening Moscow’s influence in West Africa. Togo would thus be complicit in this violation of international law.

This illegal transport of dangerous materials entails a wide range of international, environmental, and health risks. In the event of an accidentr, the consequences could be dramatic and irreversible.