Terrorism in Nigeria: How Lakurawa Becomes a Sahel Actor

Lakurawa, an armed group based in northwest Nigeria, illustrates how local militias can evolve into powerful cross-border actors. Affiliated with the Islamic State and linked to other Sahelian groups, the movement represents a growing threat to regional security.

Chapitre I : The Origins of Lakurawa: From Self-Defense Group to Contested Armed Actor

Chapitre II : From the Shadows to Open Threat

Chapitre III : Regional Alliances and International Responses

Conclusion

The Origins of Lakurawa: From Self-Defense Group to Contested Armed Actor

The name Lakurawa, reportedly meaning “the recruits” or “new members,” refers to a formation whose exact contours remain partially unclear. According to counterinsurgency expert Zagazola Makama, the movement was founded in Niger in 1997. Murtala Ahmed Rufa’i, a professor of peace and conflict studies, places its early activities around 1999 in southern Niger, near the border with Nigeria’s Sokoto State. Although these details are difficult to independently verify, they suggest a longstanding presence in a transborder space marked by pastoral mobility and weak state control.

It was, however, in 2017 that the organization truly emerged in Nigeria. In the Gudu and Tangaza districts (Sokoto State), it reportedly operated with the tacit approval of some local authorities as a self-defense force against the growing banditry and cattle theft since 2011. According to John Sunday and Ezanwa E. Olumba, its deployment responded to requests from the district chiefs of Balle and Gonzono, with support from Alhaji Bello Wamakko, then president of MACBAN, an organization representing cattle herders. In a context of rising rural violence and insufficient security forces, the group was initially seen by parts of the community as a shield against criminal gangs.

By 2018, the situation had shifted. Abubakar Lamido, secretary of MACBAN, reports that Lakurawa members increasingly preached in public squares, intimidated certain religious leaders, and imposed corporal punishment on residents accused of “un-Islamic” behavior (notably playing music or dancing). They also followed nomadic Fulani settlements (ruga), forcing herders to pay taxes on their livestock under the guise of zakat, demonstrating a desire to exercise a parallel authority over local communities.

The turning point came in late October 2018, when residents of Tangaza rose against their presence. Within a year, Lakurawa had transformed from a tolerated self-defense group into a contested armed actor. The episode underscores how entrusting population protection to unregulated armed factions can spiral out of control, destabilizing life in the region.

 
From the Shadows to Open Threat

Following its break with local populations in 2018, Lakurawa began transforming into an offensive armed force. Local reports initially describe sporadic attacks, culminating in an assault on a Nigerian military base in Gudu in 2020, marking the start of its ascent.

By late 2023, Lakurawa had begun operating more ambitiously and expansionistically, extending its influence to new communities. It drew international media attention in 2024. On November 5, Sokoto State’s deputy governor, Idris Gobir, publicly warned of Lakurawa’s presence in several areas of Tangaza, Gudu, Ilela, Silame, and Binji, citing a sophisticated arsenal and increasing criminal activity. Days later, the bloody attack in Birnin-Kebbi, known as the “Mera Tragedy,” left 17 dead and saw the theft of a hundred cattle, signaling the faction’s intention to extend its influence beyond Sokoto.

Between December 2024 and January 2025, Lakurawa crossed borders with documented attacks in Malanville (Benin), Gaya (Niger), and Tafouka (Niger), where four Nigerien soldiers were killed. According to Nigerian military spokesman Major General Edward Buba, this expansion is linked to instability in neighboring Mali and Niger, which facilitates the movement of fighters and weapons.

Simultaneously, the Nigerian government reported destroying 22 Lakurawa camps in Sokoto State during a counteroperation.

In January 2025, Nigerian authorities officially designated Lakurawa as a terrorist organization. Judge James Omotosho extended the ban to similar formations in northwest and north-central Nigeria, granting security forces enhanced powers for arrests, prosecutions, asset freezes, and increased surveillance.

Despite this designation, violence continued. Between March and December 2025, the fighters intensified raids. Birnin Dede and six villages along the Niger border were attacked in retaliation for the death of their commander at the hands of security forces. Kwallajiya village in Tangaza was hit during afternoon prayers, an official convoy ambushed at Babana-Luma, and a mixed patrol suffered heavy losses at Goubey. These operations demonstrated Lakurawa’s capacity to strike both security forces and civilians across an increasingly expansive area.

In Nigeria’s security landscape, Lakurawa emerges as one of the most concerning armed actors. It differs from Boko Haram and its ISWAP splinter—primarily active in the northeast—through its territorial anchoring and links with certain pastoral communities. Mahmuda, active in Kwara State along the Benin border, shares some coercive methods but remains less structured and less offensive than Lakurawa, which combines organized crime, attacks on security forces, and territorial control.

 
Regional Alliances and International Responses

Today, Lakurawa counts between 200 and 300 members, aged 18 to 35, originating from Mali, Chad, Libya, Niger, and Burkina Faso. The organization has also launched local recruitment in Sokoto, offering financial incentives up to one million Naira to attract young recruits, alongside its ideological messaging, according to Zagazola Makama.

Several Nigerian and U.S. authorities, as well as international media, now consider Lakurawa affiliated with the Islamic State through its Sahel branch, the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP). Terrorism analyst Chris Dayton suggests Lakurawa’s emergence aligns with IS’s regional expansion, with northwest Nigeria forming a strategic corridor from Niger to the Lake Chad Basin. The UN Security Council’s latest report (S/2025/482) corroborates this analysis, noting Lakurawa maintains bases in Dosso and Tahoua (Niger) and operates from forested areas in Sokoto and Kebbi districts. The group is reportedly led by Namata Korsinga, former deputy of the ISSP emir in Tahoua, while others point to Habib Tajje commanding operations in the two Nigerian states.

However, Lakurawa’s exact affiliation remains debated. Some Nigerian and international researchers link it to JNIM (Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims), noting operational similarities and potential JNIM participation in early Nigerian incursions. This ambiguity allows JNIM to strengthen its regional visibility. Nigerian security forces have also observed occasional interactions between Lakurawa and ISWAP, including fighter movements between the two groups. The recent ISSP attack on Niamey airport, during which fighters spoke Hausa and Kanuri—languages of northwest Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin—suggests cross-border links, placing Lakurawa at the center of a broader network connecting northeastern Nigeria and the Sahel.

The persecution of Christian populations and violence against civilians have drawn international attention. On December 25, 2025, U.S. forces, with Nigerian approval, struck Lakurawa camps in Sokoto State, labeling the operation a strike against “IS terrorist scum.” Local officials reported damage to some camps, though exact casualties remain unclear.

Looking ahead, several scenarios emerge. Lakurawa could consolidate its hold in northwest Nigeria, serving as an operational conduit for ISSP while continuing to forge ties with other regional actors. Conversely, intensified military pressure and closer regional cooperation could weaken its structure, trigger internal splits, or push a redeployment to less-controlled Sahelian border zones. The outcome will largely depend on states’ capacity to coordinate security responses while addressing local vulnerabilities.

Lakurawa exemplifies how local militias can evolve into powerful cross-border actors when security forces falter and community tensions run high. Its future will depend as much on military pressure as on the ability of states to coordinate responses and strengthen population resilience. Across the Sahel, this dynamic underscores that the threat is not isolated: numerous armed militias have emerged in recent years, often initially to defend their territories, but survival frequently requires both local acceptance and opportunistic alliances with regional actors, including sometimes terrorist groups.